The certainty-factor model was one of the most popular models for the representation and manipulation of uncertain knowledge in the early rule-based expert systems of the 1980s. After the model was criticised by researchers in arti®cial intelligence and statistics as being adhoc in nature, researchers and developers have stopped looking at the model. Nowadays, it is often stated that the model is merely interesting from a historical point of view. Its place has been taken over by more expressive formalisms for the representation and manipulation of uncertain knowledge, in particular, by the formalism of Bayesian belief networks. In this paper, it is shown that this view underestimates the importance of the principles underlying the certainty-factor model. In particular, it is shown that certainty-factor-like structures occur frequently in practical Bayesian network models as causal independence assumptions. In fact, the noisy-OR and noisy-AND models, two probabilistic models frequently employed, appear to be reinventions of combination functions previously introduced as part of the certaintyfactor model. This insight may lead to a reappraisal of the certainty-factor model. q
Introduction
In the early rule-based expert systems as developed in the 1980s, the representation and manipulation of uncertain knowledge was accomplished by various ad-hoc schemes. Typical examples of such schemes are the certainty-factor calculus of Shortliffe and Buchanan [4, 20] and the subjective Bayesian method [7] . At the time in particular the certainty-factor model enjoyed much popularity, possibly due to its mathematical and computational simplicity.
However, after the introduction of more expressive, and mathematically sound, probabilistic methods for the representation and manipulation of uncertainty the early methods have been criticised, sometimes severely, by researchers. Examples of such criticism are easily found in the literature; a selection is shown below (explanations added for the purpose of this paper are written in parentheses). For example, Heckerman states ( [9] , page 309):
¼ it is recommended that those who intend to build a system incorporating the certainty factor model consider these more general techniques (i.e. Bayesian belief networks).
whereas Neapolitan states ( [17] , pages 70±71):
The calculus for combining certainty factors ¼ is of interest primarily for its historical signi®cance.
Jensen's opinion is even stronger ( [14] , page 3):
¼ it is not possible to capture reasoning with uncertainty with inference rules for production rules.
In contrast, the criticism of Pearl is more moderate ( [18] , page 6):
The price attached to extensional systems (e.g. rulebased systems) is that they often yield updating that is incoherent, i.e. subject to surprise and counterintuitive conclusions.
Nowadays, most AI researchers probably agree with the opinions summarised above. They believe that the framework of Bayesian belief networks offers a coherent, expressive, and¯exible formalism for the representation and manipulation of uncertain knowledge, and there seems to be little reason to revert to the use of the early models of uncertainty. The author of this paper shares this opinion. Yet, the situation is not as clear-cut as it appears.
The search for a probabilistic interpretation of the certainty-factor model has attracted considerable attention from researchers in the past [4, 9, 22] . In this paper, the relationship between probability theory and the certainty-factor model is investigated once again, but this time from the perspective of Bayesian belief networks. Whereas the earlier works only pointed out a number of problems with the probabilistic interpretation of the certainty-factor model, here it is shown that parts of the certainty-factor model have in fact been reintroduced by Bayesian belief network theoreticians without knowing. Important fragments of the certainty-factor model are used as essential ingredients of many practical network models. In addition to adopting a different probabilistic framework, the present work also differs from the earlier works by looking for a mapping of parts of the theory of Bayesian belief networks to the certainty-factor model, and not the reverse, re¯ecting the current state of the art in the ®eld. We think the results of this study to be important, because it shows that particular probabilistic models have been introduced by various research traditions independently, indicating their general signi®cance. Furthermore, this study also sheds some light on current Bayesian belief network modelling practice. As we have not been able to ®nd similar results in the literature, we believe this result to be new.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section, the certainty-factor model is introduced. Next, we study various probabilistic models that seem good candidates for their mapping to fragments of the certaintyfactor model. To what extent such mappings are possible is also investigated. The practical signi®cance of the various probabilistic models selected is next illustrated by a number of real-life applications as found in the literature. The paper is rounded off by a discussion of the practical consequences of the results achieved in this paper.
The certainty-factor model
In this section, the basic principles of the certainty-factor model, so far as needed for the reading of this paper, are brie¯y reviewed.
Certainty factors
The certainty-factor model was introduced by Shortliffe and Buchanan as a method for the representation and manipulation of uncertain knowledge in the rule-based expert system MYCIN [4, 20] , and later incorporated, in slightly modi®ed form, in the prototypical rule-based expert-system shell EMYCIN [4] . The basic idea underlying the method is that when representing knowledge as production rules of the form if e then h x ®, a measure of uncertainty x is associated with the hypothesis h, expressing the degree to which the observation of evidence e in¯uences the con®dence in h. In developing the certainty-factor model Shortliffe and Buchanan have chosen two basic measures of uncertainty: the measure of belief MB(h,e) expressing the degree to which an observed piece of evidence e increases the belief in a hypothesis h, and the measure of disbelief MD(h,e), expressing the degree to which an observed piece of evidence e decreases the belief in a hypothesis h. Each of these measures lie in the closed interval [0,1].
The measure of belief MB(h,e) and the measure of disbelief MD(h,e) are de®ned in terms of probability theory as relative changes with respect to the prior probability Pr(h), based on available evidence e. Although intuitively attractive at ®rst sight, Heckerman [9] and Van der Gaag [22] showed that this choice renders the certainty-factor model inconsistent with the basic axioms of probability theory. Heckerman, however, has been able to ®nd alternative de®-nitions for these measures in terms of likelihood ratios, yielding mathematically sound probabilistic interpretations of the model [9] .
A certainty factor CF(h,e) is just a numerical measure between 21 and 11, de®ned in terms of measures of belief and disbelief. The actual de®nition is not relevant for this paper (cf. Ref. [15] ). A negative certainty factor indicates that the hypothesis h is discon®rmed by the evidence e; a positive certainty factor indicates that the hypothesis h is con®rmed by the evidence e. A certainty factor equal to zero indicates that the evidence e does not in¯uence the belief in the hypothesis h. In most implementations of the certainty factor model, the measures of belief MB(h,e) and disbelief MD(h,e) are no longer used; only the certainty factor is employed. Consequently, with each production rule if e then h ® is now associated a certainty factor CF(h,e); this can also be depicted as a directed graph, as shown below:
Combination functions
For the manipulation of certainty factors, Shortliffe and Buchanan have de®ned a number of combination functions, expressed in terms of certainty factors. For an extensive motivation underlying their design, the reader is referred to Ref. [4] .
The combination function for the propagation of uncertain evidence from the antecedent of a production rule to its consequences, as shown in the following directed graph e 0 ÿÿÿÿÿÿ! CFe;e 0 e ÿÿÿÿÿÿ!
CFh;e h is the following:
CFh; e 0 CFh; e´max{0; CFe; e 0 } 1
Here, CF(h,e) is the certainty factor associated with the hypothesis h by the production rule if e then h ® if the evidence e has been observed with absolute certainty; CF(e,e 0 ) indicates the actual con®dence in e based on some prior evidence e 0 , and acts as a weighting factor to CF(h,e). If the rule's antecedent is false, the resulting weighting factor will be 0, as indicated in formula (1) .
The function for combining two certainty factors CF(e 1 ,e 0 ) and CF(e 2 ,e 0 ) of two constituting pieces of evidence e 1 and e 2 to obtain a certainty factor for the conjunction e 1 and e 2 of these pieces of evidence, as The combination functions (2) and (3) are commutative and associative in their ®rst argument; so the order in which conjunctions and disjunctions are evaluated has no effect on the resulting certainty factor. Finally, the combination function for combining two certainty factors CFh; e (4) is commutative and associative in its second argument; so, the order in which production rules are applied has no effect on the ®nal result.
As an example, consider the following medical rule base R: R {R 1 : if flu then fever CF fever;flu0:8 fi; R 2 : if common-cold then fever CF fever;common-cold0:3 fi} Furthermore, assume that we have the following facts concerning a patient: CF(¯u, e 0 ) 0.6 and CF(commoncold, e 0 ) 1, where e 0 denotes background knowledge; in words: we are uncertain to some extent whether the patient has the¯u, but we are completely certain that the patient has a common cold. The certainty of whether or not the patient has a fever is then calculated as follows, using the combination functions discussed above. First, the uncertainty with respect to the presence of the¯u is propagated to the conclu- This result is higher than the individual certainty factors, but still lower than the maximum of the certainty factors attached to the rules, 0.8. This seems intuitively right, because we are not particularly certain about the presence of the¯u, whereas knowing that a patient has a common cold is only weak evidence for the presence of fever.
As mentioned above, Heckerman has proposed a number of suitable transformations of the certainty-factor model to probability theory [9] . However, Heckerman's approach did not really reveal the probabilistic structure underlying the certainty-factor model, as alternative de®nitions of its combination functions were given in an attempt to provide a probabilistic interpretation of the model. Our goals are different, as we take Bayesian belief networks as the point of departure, and then investigate the relationship between Bayesian belief networks and the certainty-factor model. Thus, we are actually interested in the inverse problem. Consequently, the parts of the certainty-factor model we will consider are determined by their analogy to certain belief-network models.
In the following sections, it is investigated under which conditions Bayesian belief network models correspond to ingredients of the certainty-factor model.
Certainty-factor interpretation of Bayesian belief networks
Above, we have summarised the principles of the certainty-factor model. In this section, we trace probabilistic models that correspond to fragments of the certainty-factor model.
Employed notation
Stochastic variables will be denoted by upper-case letter, e.g. X; values of variables will be denoted by lower-case letters, e.g. x. In the case of binary variables, the value X true will be denoted by X x; or simply x; the value X false is denoted by X :x; or simply :x. All variables are assumed to be discrete. By an expression like X f X 1 ;¼;X n c cX 1 ; ¼; X n is indicated a summation of function values of a function c , ranging over all possible values of the variables X 1 ,¼,X n satisfying the functional constraint f X 1 ; ¼; X n c: A probability distribution will be denoted by Pr.
Causal independence
In building Bayesian belief networks for practical purposes it has been argued by several researchers that considering the assumption of causal independence may be very fruitful [8,10±12] . The global structure of a causal-independence model is shown in Fig. 1 ; it expresses the idea that causes C 1 ; ¼; C n in¯uence a given common effect E through intermediate variables I 1 ; ¼; I n and a deterministic function f. The in¯uence of each cause C k on the common effect E is independent of each cause C j , j ± k: The function f represents in which way the intermediate effects I k , and indirectly also the causes C k , interact to yield a ®nal effect E. Hence, this function f is de®ned in such way that when a relationship as modelled by the function f between I k i k ; k 1; ¼; n; and E e is satis®ed, then it holds that e f i 1 ; ¼; i n :
In terms of probability theory, the notion of causal independence can be formalised for a distinguished value e of E as follows:
meaning that the causes C 1 ; ¼; C n in¯uence the common effect E through the intermediate effects I 1 ; ¼; I n only when e f I 1 ; ¼; I n for certain values I k i k ; k 1; ¼; n: Under this condition, it is assumed that Preui 1 ; ¼; i n 1; otherwise, when f i 1 ; ¼; i n e 0 ± e; it holds that Preui 1 ; ¼; i n 0: Note that the effect variable E is conditionally independent of C 1 ; ¼; C n given the intermediate variables I 1 ; ¼; I n ; and that each variable I k is only dependent on its associated variable C k ; hence, it holds that PreuI 1 ; ¼; I n ; C 1 ; ¼; C n PreuI 1 ; ¼; I n and PrI 1 ; ¼; I n uC 1 ; ¼; C n Y n k1
PrI k uC k
The formula above can now be simpli®ed to:
PrI k uC k 5
Based on the assumptions above, it also holds that
PrI k uC k Formula (5) above is practically speaking not very useful, because the size of the speci®cation of the function f is exponential in the number of its arguments. The resulting probability distribution is therefore in general computationally intractable, both in terms of space and time requirements. An important subclass of causal independence models, however, is formed by models in which the deterministic function f can be de®ned in terms of separate binary functions g k , also denoted by g k (I k ,I k11 ). Such causal independence models have been called decomposable causal independence models [11] ; these models are of signi®cant practical importance. Usually, all functions g k (I k ,I k11 ) are identical for each k; a function g k (I k ,I k11 ) may therefore be simply denoted by g(I,I 0 ). Typical examples of decomposable causal independence models are the noisy-OR [5, 8, 13, 18, 21] and noisy-MAX [5, 12, 21] models. Other popular causal independence models are the noisy-AND and noisy-MIN models. These models will be studied below.
Noisy-OR model
As shown above, it is the precise de®nition of the function f of a causal independence model that distinguishes one model from the other. Hence, for simplicity's sake, it is allowed to discard intermediate variables. Also, since only the use of decomposable causal independence models is practically feasible, it seems justi®ed to merely consider three-node models as shown in Fig. 2 , without loss of generality. Now, suppose that the three variables A, B and C are binary variables, and assume that node C represents a logical OR, i. since the variables A and B are independent. We can rewrite this result in two different ways:
1
:b) 1 2 Pr(:a)Pr(:b) (because, Pr(:a, :b) was discarded in the sum above), which is a well-known formula used to de®ne the noisy-OR model [18] .
Note that Pr:c 1 2 Prc Pr:aPr:b is unspeci®ed in the certainty-factor model, because certainty factors only concern positive literals. In principle, however, it might be dealt with by the method discussed later in Section 3.5. Actually, this limitation is not too important, because we take probability theory as our starting point. Hence, it appears that the noisy-OR model has exactly the same mathematical structure as combination function (4) for co-concluding production rules of the certainty-factor model for binary variables.
Noisy-MAX model
When we drop the restriction that the variables in the three-node model must be binary, the probabilistic interpretation changes. Without loss of generality, let us assume that A, B and C are ternary variables. Furthermore, assume that the values of the given variables satisfy the following linear order: The resulting probabilistic model is known as the noisy-MAX model [5, 12] .
Using this de®nition of g, it holds that The difference between the two results can be explained in terms of the matrix shown in Table 1 . Using the noisy-MAX model, the probability Pr(c i ) is de®ned as the sum of the probability Pr(a i ,b i ) on the diagonal of the matrix, supplemented with elements below and to the right of the element (a i ,b i ), i.e.
In the case of the combination function for co-concluding production rules, all elements on the ith row and column are added, with the diagonal element Pr(a i ,b i ) just added once, resulting in:
As a consequence, particular numbers Pr(a i ,b j ) will not only contribute to Pr 0 (c i ), but also to Pr 0 (c j ), i ± j; i.e. they are counted twice as part of the probability distribution Pr 0 (C). The resulting probability distribution Pr 0 is therefore inconsistent.
An interesting question is whether the probability distribution Pr 0 can be made consistent, and, if so, in which way. The causal independence model that corresponds to the certainty-factor model appears to be de®ned by the It appears that the causal independence model for nonbinary variables using combination function (4) for coconcluding production rules is related to the noisy-MAX model, but nevertheless different for all but the probability of the value of the variable C that is highest in the given linear order. The resulting model was shown to be probabilistically inconsistent. It is not dif®cult to resolve the inconsistency, yielding a model that is still related to the noisy-MAX model. However, the resulting probabilistic model cannot be represented in terms of the certainty-factor model.
Noisy-AND model
The noisy-OR appears to be one of the most popular probabilistic models used in building practical Bayesian belief networks. However, this model is not suitable when one is primarily interested in modelling the conjunctive effect of particular causes. This idea naturally leads to the concept of the noisy-AND model. Using again the topology of the graph depicted in Fig. 2 , the noisy-AND model can be de®ned in terms of a probabilistic representation of the logical AND: PrcuA; BPrA; B PraPrb because A and B are independent. This result does not correspond to the combination function for co-concluding production rules (4). However, it is possible to represent the noisy-AND model in terms of the combination function for the propagation of evidence (1), using two production rules as follows:
given the probability distributions Pr(A) and Pr(B), and assuming that the subscript 1.0 attached to c represents a certainty factor. Using combination function (1) twice yields the required result for C. This probability can be mapped to the certainty-factor model in the same way as done for the noisy-AND model discussed above.
In general we have that
which expresses that Pr(c i ) is obtained as the sum of Pr(a i ,b i ) on the diagonal of Table 1 , supplemented with elements Pr(a i ,b j ) on the ith row to the left of element (a i ,b i ) and elements Pr(a j ,b i ) on the ith column above element (a i ,b i ) of No mapping exists in this case, and the same is true for Pr(c 3 ). Similar to the noisy-MAX model, a mapping of the full noisy-MIN model to the certainty-factor model is only possible for binary variables, in which case the noisy-MIN model and the noisy-AND model are identical.
Propagation of evidence
Consider the probabilistic network shown in Fig. 3 ; it is identical to the network model in Fig. 2, except Now, suppose that we know for certain that the patient has a common cold, whereas the probability that the patient has the¯u is only 0.6. Using the method given above, the marginal probability distribution for each variable in the network has been computed, as shown in the ®gure. The probability that the patient has a fever is 0.636. It now appears that this example corresponds to the certainty-factor formulation of the same problem as discussed in Section 2.2.
Practical signi®cance
Earlier we have seen that important Bayesian beliefnetwork models, or parts of such models, can be mapped to fragments of the certainty-factor model. However, the results of this paper would have little signi®cance, when in almost all practical belief-network models the assumptions underlying decomposable, causal independence would not be satis®ed. However, the opposite seems to be the case: in many practical Bayesian belief network models, many causal independence assumptions are made. This is to be expected, because the technology of Bayesian belief networks is only practically useful when a large amount of information concerning independence, with causal independence as a special case, is available in a domain. A number of actual network models, as described in the literature, is brie¯y discussed to illustrate the point. Heckerman and colleagues have described a probabilistic network for printer trouble shooting [12] . The structure of this network seems quite typical for networks used for detecting hardware faults. Assumptions of causal independence are rather essential ingredients of the network, and the arguments developed in this paper seem to fully apply to this network.
Dõ Âez and colleagues [6] have developed a Bayesian belief network for the diagnosis of heart disease, in which both the noisy-OR and noisy-MAX models are used to represent interactions among causes. Another, well-known example, is the probabilistic reformulation of Internist-1/ QMR, often referred to as QMR-DT (Decision-Theoretic reformulation of QMR), which uses the same assumptions [16] .
Another interesting consequence of the results of this paper is that it at least partially explains the similarity in the conclusions of the assessment of the sensitivity of the MYCIN system to changes in certainty factors that was carried out in the 1970s [4] , and a recent major study of the sensitivity of Bayesian belief networks to changes in their underlying probability distribution [19] . In both studies, it was concluded that the advice produced by the systems was rather insensitive to changes in the underlying numbers. However, the Bayesian belief networks that were studied incorporated noisy-OR and noisy-MAX models for the representation of interactions. Hence, the structural assumptions of these two studies were quite similar, which has not been recognised before.
Of course, causal independence does not play such an important role in all Bayesian belief networks. However, even in networks in which the notions of causal independence has not been adopted as a central modelling paradigm, e.g. the MUNIN network [2] , such assumptions appear to underlie a large part of the probabilistic assessments.
Although many Bayesian belief networks heavily rely on the assumption of causal independence, this does not mean that the certainty-factor calculus would be suf®cient to manipulate such networks. This only holds when it is prevented that stochastic dependencies are introduced due to the entering of evidence. In networks purely used for diagnosis, and not for prediction purposes, causes of problems usually reside in the upper part of the network; ®ndings that may be observed for a given case reside in the lower part of the network. When particular ®ndings concerning a problem case are entered into the lower part of the network, new probabilistic dependencies would be induced. This could be handled by dynamically adapting the structure of the network, in such way that it explicitly re¯ects the new dependencies. Although this conclusion limits the practical usefulness of the certainty-factor calculus for such applications, it still holds that the underlying probabilistic model would be similar or even identical to fragments of the certainty-factor model.
In applications of prediction and planning it is in principle possible to use the certainty-factor calculus as a method for probabilistic inference if the structure of the network follows the principles discussed in this paper. An example of such a network, meant to assist medical specialists in the treatment of infectious diseases, is described in Ref. [3] . This observation is interesting from the perspective of the design of ef®cient algorithms for probabilistic inference [1, 5, 23, 24] .
Conclusions
We have studied the mapping of probabilistic structures to fragments of the certainty-factor model. As was to be expected, only very speci®c probabilistic models can be dealt with in this way. Nevertheless, these structures appear to be of major practical importance to developers of Bayesian networks for speci®c problem domains. As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, it is not our intention to promote renewed popularity of the use of the certainty-factor model. Given the current state of research, this would be absurd. However, the conclusion that the certainty-factor model is more important than most researchers nowadays think, seems inescapable. We can learn something from the early models of uncertainty in terms of probabilistic structures that have general signi®cance. We believe that the results of this paper ought to be common knowledge to arti®cial-intelligence researchers.
We ®nally would like to make a plea for a more balanced view of the certainty-factor model; too often researchers have expressed opinions about the model that are not supported by scienti®c facts.
